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The Death of al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn and
a “Thwarted” Coup d’État1
John P. Turner, Colby College

1

This article focuses on the point at which the slave soldiers of al-Muʿtaṣim (r. a.h. 218–227/833–842 c.e.)
rose to the political forefront and came to dominate
the holder of the Caliphal seat. It is a study of the
mechanisms by which the center of the state, and
more specifically the Caliph, came to be their captives. D. Ayalon has argued that “the appearance
of the Mamlūks as a major military force under the
ʿAbbāsids roughly coincided with the beginning of
the disintegration of their caliphate, a fact which prevented the caliphs from making proper use of them.”2
Let us now explore that disintegration from a very different viewpoint. To begin, let me turn to al-Dīnawarī,
who wrote:
This article was first presented to the “Origins and Early Nature of Military Slavery in the Islamic World; International Workshop in Honor of David Ayalon,” December 18, 2008, at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. There are many who deserve my
thanks: Reuven Amitai and Amikam Elad for the invitation, and the
participants and attendees for their comments and rigorous questions that greatly strengthened the paper. Amikam Elad deserves
special thanks for reading and commenting on an earlier draft. The
anonymous reviewers provided much-valued feedback as well. Any
remaining faults are mine. I am also thankful to Colby College for
the generous Social Science Grant 01.2236 that funded the research
for this article.
2
D. Ayalon, Islam and the Abode of War (Norfolk, 1994), 23
(sub. “The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Muʿtaṣim”).
1

And indeed he [al-Maʾmūn] had the oath of allegiance taken for his son al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn
as heir apparent (walī al-ʿahd) after him and
he delegated responsibility for Iraq to him; and
when he died he was on the River Budandūn3
along with his brother Abū Isḥāq, Muḥammad
b. Hārūn al-Muʿtaṣim bi-llah. And he called the
senior commanders and soldiers to join him
and he called them to swear allegiance to him
and they paid allegiance to him. And so he left
from Tarsus until he arrived at the City of Peace.
He then entered it and removed (deposed) alʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn from it (the throne) and
defeated him. The [important] people (al-nās)
swore allegiance to him in it. And his arrival
in Baghdad was at the beginning of the month
of Ramadan of the year 218 (mid-September,
833). And so he stayed there two years and then
moved along with his Turks to surra man raʾā.4

I.e., at the modern village of Pozanti (Gr. Podandos) in
Turkey. G. le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge, 1905), 134. For mention of Budandūn as a spring, see Ibn
Khurradādhbih, Kitāb al-masālik wal-mamālik, ed. M. J. De Goeje
(Leiden, 1967), 110.
4
Abū Ḥanīfa Aḥmad b. Dāwūd al-Dīnawarī, Kitāb al-akhbār alṭiwāl, ed. V. F. Guirgass and I. I. U. Kratchkovsky (Leiden, 1888),
3
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With the above account in mind, I would like to explore a two-part hypothesis: first, that Al-Muʿtaṣim
with the aid of Ahmad b. Abī Duʾād murdered alMaʾmūn;5 and second, that the Amorion campaign
and subsequent purge of al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn and
of al-Maʾmūn’s generals were the final consolidation
of that act.6
The Death of al-Maʾmūn
To elucidate the support for this hypothesis, let us
now turn to the last five years of al-Maʾmūn’s reign.7
In 213/828 the Caliph placed his son al-ʿAbbās in
charge of the frontier provinces bordering the Byzantines, apparently preparing him for the succession.8 By
215/830, without supplanting him, al-Maʾmūn had
effectively moved the court closer to the Byzantine
frontier where he was on a campaign of conquest.9 He
396.13–.20. Al-nās of course refers to the great notables of the
court and not to the masses.
5
El-Hibri makes a passing and unparsed observation that is key
for my argument: “Other evidence shows that al-Muʿtaṣim succeeded to the throne either by altering the caliph’s will, hastening the death of al-Maʾmūn, forcing al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn (the
legitimate heir apparent) to renounce his rights of succession, or
by doing all three.” El-Hibri regards the historicity of the entire
episode with deep suspicion. T. El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic
Historiography (Cambridge, 1999), 120. He reiterates this in more
directly accusatory fashion on p. 141, n. 119. While acknowledging
the validity of the skepticism, I perceive threads of historical connection worthy of exploration in a different fashion. Ghada JayyusiLehn explores the death of al-Maʾmūn and perceives him to have
been murdered by al-Muʿtaṣim as well. G. Jayyusi-Lehn, “The Caliphate of al-Muʿtaṣim: Succession or Capture?,” in Abbasid Studies
II: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, ed. J. A. Nawas
(Leuven, 2010), 107–18.
6
Nawas assumes a connection between al-Muʿtaṣim’s succession
and the imprisonment of al-ʿAbbās but does not explore it. J. A.
Nawas, “All in the Family? Al-Muʿtaṣim’s Succession to the Caliphate as Denoument to the Lifelong Feud Between al-Maʾmūn and
his Abbasid Family,” Oriens 38 (2010): 87–88. Marsham implies
one as well. A. Marsham, Rituals of Islamic Monarchy (Edinburgh,
2009), 267.
7
In the interest of space I will not be discussing the Miḥna here.
8
Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh al-rusul waʾlmulūk, ed. M. J. de Goeje, 15 vols. (Leiden, 1879), iii, 1100. He
placed him in charge of the Jazira in 214 at the same time that he
appointed al-Muʿtaṣim over Egypt. Aḥmad b. Abī Yaʿqūb b. Jaʿfar
al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh al-Yaʿqūbī, vol. 2, ed. ʿA. A. Muhannā (Beirut:
Muʿassasa al-ʿUlamī liʾl-Maṭbūʿāt, 1993), 423.
9
Especially see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1106. From Damascus,
al-Maʾmūn dispatched the leader for the Hajj. That person then
went to Baghdad and launched it from there. As well (p. 1107),
al-Maʾmūn went to restore order in Egypt in Muharram 217 (Feb-

was not merely engaging in pro forma seasonal raiding,
but was intent on capturing and holding a position
north of the Cilician Gates. By 216/831, Ṭuwāna/
Tyana was being used as an operational staging site.10
The campaign of 218/833 was of a similar character. Al-Maʾmūn set off for the Byzantine frontier
from Tarsus after having an exchange of letters with
the Byzantine Emperor the year before (217). Given
the tenor of both letters (as recorded in al-Ṭabarī),
al-Maʾmūn was spoiling for a fight.11 At about the
same time, al-ʿAbbās was dispatched to fortify a large
installation at Ṭuwāna.12 It was massive and intended
as a permanent foothold. Al-Ṭabarī tells us that the
walls had a circumference of three farsakhs, which is
between fifteen and twenty kilometers. After having
passed through the Cilician Gates on his way to join
forces with al-ʿAbbās at Ṭuwāna, al-Maʾmūn paused
at the halfway point at Budandūn.13
While there, al-Maʾmūn died under most suspicious
circumstances. According to al-Ṭabarī, while resting
he ate some newly arrived dates and became ill.14 The
ruary–March 832) and afterwards “returned to Syria.” Al-Maʾmūn
had reason to avoid Baghdad and he did so, spending approximately
half of his reign elsewhere. Also see P. von Sivers, “Taxes and Trade
in the ʿAbbāsid Thughūr, 750–962/133–351,” JESHO 25 (1982):
78–79.
10
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1104.
11
Ibid., iii, 1109–11. For an in-depth discussion of the letters,
see V. De Gifis, “Qurʾānic Rhetoric in the Politics of al-Maʾmūn’s
Caliphate” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2008), 189–221.
12
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1111–12. Al-Masʿūdī mentioned
Ṭuwāna in the same context. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Masʿūdī, Murūj
al-dhahab wa maʿādin al-jawhar, v. 4, ed. M. H. Al-Naʿsān (Beirut: Dar el-Marefah, 2005), 38. Yāqūt mentioned al-Maʾmūn’s
building program and that it was meant to house a great many
troops. He also mentioned that al-Muʿtaṣim destroyed it. Yāqūt
al-Ḥamawī, Muʿjam al-Buldān, ed. Muhammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
al-Marʿashlī, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ihiya al-Turath al-ʿArabī, 1997),
s.v. “Ṭuwāna.” Kennedy also interprets the fortification program
as part of the preparations for a major operation for conquest.
H. Kennedy, When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World (Cambridge,
MA, 2005), 210.
13
Budandūn is almost exactly halfway between Tarsus and
Ṭuwāna. Al-Ṭabarī said that it was also the name of a river. AlMasʿūdī said that it was a spring that formed a river. Al-Yaʿqūbī
describes it as between Tarsus and Luʾluʾa (Loulon), which is on the
road to Ṭuwāna. al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 429. For the identification
of Luʾluʾa, see Strange, Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, 134, 139.
14
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1134–36. Al-Masʿūdī provided a different version which says that he was splashed with very cold water,
caught a chill and died as a result. al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-dhahab,
v. 4, 39–40. El-Hibri discusses the different versions from a literary
standpoint, highlighting their suspiciousness. El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 112–21.
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narrator takes pains to assure the reader that both he
and al-Muʿtaṣim ate the dates and became ill at the
same time as al-Maʾmūn.15 Because his death on the
frontier was entirely too convenient for al-Muʿtaṣim,
the point of the interjection was to obviously and plausibly allay suspicions that al-Maʾmūn was poisoned.
Al-Maʾmūn died on Rajab 17, 218/August 10, 83316
and was buried in Tarsus.17 It is usually thought that
after the disastrous attempt to appoint ʿAlī al-Riḍā as
heir, al-Maʾmūn had failed to fill this position until
very near the end of his life.18 Nawas argues that as
a result of family pressures, al-Maʾmūn was left little
choice but to designate al-Muʿtaṣim as heir.19 Immediately upon his death, al-Muʿtaṣim became Caliph.
Al-Ṭabarī, among others, tells us that al-ʿAbbās was
there when al-Maʾmūn died.20 Gordon has asserted
the entirely reasonable proposition that al-Muʿtaṣim
took advantage of the untimely death of a caliph (his
brother) to seize control.21 However, upon closer
examination, something else is at work here. Despite
being labeled by al-Ṭabarī as an oration, al-Maʾmūn’s
will is reflective, closely worded, argued and thought
out, and not the words of a dying man moving in and
out of lucidity.22 This text deserves closer scrutiny than
it has received up to this point. Under the circumJayyusi-Lehn also notes this. G. Jayyusi-Lehn, “The Caliphate
of al-Muʿtaṣim,” 112.
16
Al-Ṭabarī also said Rajab 18. al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1140.
Al-Yaʿqūbī said the 17th. al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 429. Al-Dīnawarī
said it was Rajab 8 with which al-Masʿūdī agrees. al-Dīnawarī,
al-akhbār, v. 1, 396. al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-dhahab, v. 4, 40.
17
See M. Cooperson, “The Grave of al-Maʾmūn in Tarsus,” in
ʿAbbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbasid Studies,
Cambridge, 6–10 July 2002, ed. J. Montgomery (Leuven, 2004).
18
For more on that appointment see D. G. Tor, “An Historiographical Re-examination of the Appointment and Death of ʿAlī
al-Riḍā,” Der Islam 78 (2001); and M. Cooperson, Classical Arabic
Biography (Cambridge, 2000), chapter 3. Madelung implies that
the decision to choose al-Muʿtaṣim was almost flippant. W. Madelung, “New Documents Concerning al-Maʾmūn, al-Faḍl b. Sahl
and ʿAlī al-Riḍāʾ,” in Studia Arabica et Islamica, ed. W. al-Qāḍī
(Beirut, 1981).
19
Nawas, “All in the Family?”
20
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1135–36.
21
M. Gordon, The Breaking of a Thousand Swords (Albany, NY,
2001), 47.
22
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1136–40. Van Ess raises questions
about the authenticity of the will. J. van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra (New York, 1991), v. 3,
486–88. Cited by Nawas, “All in the Family?,” 87, n. 40; I thank the
anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this. El-Hibri and Cooperson also make the same observation. El-Hibri, Reinterpreting
Islamic Historiography, 120. M. Cooperson, Al-Maʾmūn (Oxford,
15
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stances, the will was either composed in advance or ex
post facto by someone other than al-Maʾmūn.
Let us consider the latter possibility. The most
likely culprit is Ahmad b. Abī Duʾād, especially as
he was given such a prominent place and continuing role by the will itself.23 The secondary literature
most often presents him as al-Maʾmūn’s deputy, but
there is evidence that questions that labeling. Ibn Abī
Duʾād and al-Muʿtaṣim had an established working
relationship during al-Maʾmūn’s reign. During his
assignment to al-Muʿtaṣim’s camp (215/830–31) in
the mission to Egypt, Ibn Abī Duʾād proved himself
loyal to al-Muʿtaṣim in defiance of al-Maʾmūn.24 In
Ibn Ḥajar’s account, when he was appointed to the
maẓālim in al-Muʿtaṣim’s camp, Ibn Abī Duʾād was
not an important person. Ironically, he was recommended to al-Maʾmūn by Yaḥyā b. Aktham. Ibn Abī
Duʾād’s prominent role in the Miḥna began during
al-Muʿtaṣim’s reign. He was not chief judge under
al-Maʾmūn; that was a position that he acquired after
the latter’s death. As all of the later ʿAbbāsid caliphs
were descended from al-Muʿtaṣim, there would be
little incentive for contemporaries to point out the
forgery.
The Will
Let us now examine the will in depth. The first part is
relatively uncontroversial, giving prescriptions about
burial.25 However, for the rest of the will, its author
conveniently knew what al-Muʿtaṣim would do next,
both immediately and over the course of the following
2005), 122. According to Nawas, Jayyusi-Lehn has addressed this
in her dissertation, which I have not had a chance to read.
23
El-Hibri, without going into depth, notes some of the provisions of the will, the relationship to Ibn Abī Duʾād, and their almost
prescient nature. He states that they were most likely written at the
court of al-Muʿtaṣim “at the behest of ” Ibn Abī Duʾād. El-Hibri,
Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 121.
24
M. Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq et l’état abbasside (132/750–
334/945) (Damas: IFPO, 2009), 556. Citing and translating
Aḥmad b. Alī Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Rafʿ al-isr ʿan qudāt Miṣr, ed.
ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji bi-al-Qahirah,
1998), 47.
25
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1136–40. Unfortunately, the copy that
we have of the Kitāb Baghdad that survives breaks off without including this. Aḥmad Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Sechster Band des Kitâb
Bagdâd, ed. H. Keller (Leipzig, 1908). El-Hibri speculates that the
funerary provisions can be “connected with the question of the
‘torment of the grave’. . .” El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 121.
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few years. Either al-Muʿtaṣim was a complete slave to
his brother’s will, or it was written at a later date.26
We should now go through its provisions point by
point; after the burial instructions, there are thirteen
of them. First, al-Muʿtaṣim was exhorted to hurry
back to Baghdad.27 All of the sources agree that this
is what he did.28 He entered it on 1 Ramadan 218/30
September 833, about forty days after al-Maʾmūn’s
death. The will indicates that he had to do this to
secure his position. Most sources recount that he left
in great haste, with some indicating that he did so in
fear of the officers by whom he was surrounded. Those
sources say that they were upset that al-ʿAbbās had
been passed over and were inclined to pledge their
support to him. Al-Muʿtaṣim had to work hard to
forestall this possibility. He used the entire forty-day
mourning period to march back to Baghdad. Although
there is no discussion of mourning rituals, neither is
it stated what took so long. The “Fragmenta,” which
so often is in agreement with al-Ṭabarī’s version of
events, does not differ much here; where it does differ,
however, is intriguing:
He was Abū Isḥāq Muḥammad b. Hārūn alRashīd, and his mother was Mārida and she was
an umm walad. The oath of allegiance was taken
to him on the day al-Maʾmūn died and he was
with him in Tarsus in Rajab of the year 218.29
At the time when al-Maʾmūn died the army rioted against al-Muʿtaṣim and they demanded alʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn. They acclaimed al-ʿAbbās
by the name of Caliph. And so al-Muʿtaṣim sent
for al-ʿAbbās. And he took the oath of allegiance
to him. Al-ʿAbbās went to the army and he said
to them: “what is this stupid affection, indeed
I took the oath of allegiance to my uncle and
handed the Caliphate to him.” The army became quiet and al-Muʿtaṣim, with al-ʿAbbās b.
al-Maʾmūn, quickly and in fear for himself from
the commanders, left for Baghdad. Indeed they
were clamoring in distress about him and they
demanded al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn. And so he
El-Hibri observes this as well; ibid.
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1138.
28
For a sampling, see ibid., iii, 1164. al-Dīnawarī, al-akhbār,
396. M. J. De Goeje, Fragmenta historicorum arabicorum, 2 vols.
(Leiden, 1869), v. 1, 380. ʿAbdallāh b. Muslim Ibn Qutayba, alMaʿārif, ed. Tharwat ʿUkāsha (Miṣr: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1969), 392.
al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 430.
29
Note that the place of death is different.
26
27

[al-Muʿtaṣim] heaped scorn on them and he approached Baghdad on Saturday the first day of
Ramadan in the year 218.30
Note that the army continued to clamor even
after al-ʿAbbās’s statement. It is very interesting that
al-ʿAbbās was described as having handed over the
Caliphate. This of course implies that he was in possession of it and that it was his to give.31 Al-Ṭabarī
said the exact same thing, with the exception that in
his account al-Muʿtaṣim was not fleeing the imperial
army in fear for his life.32 Ibn Aʿtham, also giving much
the same information, added that the commanders
from whom he was fleeing had accused him of murdering al-Maʾmūn.33 That he was accused by some of
the commanders makes sense of his hurried departure
for Baghdad.34 At the very least, the sources provide
compelling circumstantial evidence that al-Maʾmūn
was murdered. Ibn al-Ṣābiʾ and Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa
both quoted al-Ṣulī’s kitāb al-awrāq as saying that
al-Muʿtaṣim interfered deliberately in al-Maʾmūn’s
medical care, leading directly and intentionally to
his death.35 Those sources implicated al-Muʿtaṣim’s
occasional, but not regular, doctor, Ibn Māsawayh.
30
De Goeje, Fragmenta, v. 1, 380. Ibn al-Athīr’s account is
similar. ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fīʾl-taʾrıkh, ed. C. J. Tornberg (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1965), v. 6, 439. Al-Masʿūdī mentioned
tensions between al-Muʿtaṣim and al-ʿAbbās at the succession. alMasʿūdī, Murūj al-dhahab, v. 4, 42.
31
Also note the literary tension embedded in “and so alMuʿtaṣim sent for al-ʿAbbās. And he took the oath of allegiance to
him” (see note 30). Who exactly was pledging allegiance to whom?
The next sentence resolves the tension.
32
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1164.
33
His account is similar to that found in the Fragmenta, with the
exceptions that al-Muʿtaṣim did not take al-ʿAbbās with him but the
author included the accusation of murder. Aḥmad Ibn Aʿtham alKufī, Kitāb al-futūh (Hyderabad: Maṭbaʿat Majlis Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif
al-ʿUthmānīya, 1968–1975), v. 8, 343–44. Cited and translated by
Gordon, Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 48.
34
At another point, Yaḥyā b. Aktham accused al-Muʿtaṣim in
front of al-Maʾmūn of trying to break his oath of allegiance. alYaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 423. I thank Amikam Elad for this reference.
35
The quotations are practically verbatim of each other, leading to the conclusion that both were quoting from al-Ṣulī. Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate this in the kitāb al-awrāq.
Muḥammad b. Hilāl al-Ṣābiʾ, al-Hafawāt al-nādira, ed. Ṣ. al-Ashtar
(Damascus: Maṭbūʿat majmaʿ al-lugha al-ʿarabiya bi-dimashq,
1967), 183–85. Aḥmad b. Qāsim Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ
fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ, ed. M. B. ʿUyūn al-Sūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kotob
al-Ilmiyah, 1998), 231. Also see ʿAlī b. Yūsuf al-Qifṭī, Taʾrīkh alḥukamā, ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig, 1903), 391. El-Hibri cites al-Ṣābiʾ.
El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography, 141 n. 119. I thank
Michael Cooperson for the reference to Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa.
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Given the circumstances and outcome, the culprit and
his motives appear obvious. Add to this the discontent registered by the officers and that the purge with
which the Amorion campaign was concluded was so
complete and severe that there must be a connection between the events. Ibn Qutayba’s account is
eye-opening:
He is Muḥammad b. Hārūn and he was given
the kunya Abū Isḥāq and his mother was Mārida,
a slave girl and Abū Isḥāq was with his brother
and al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn at the time when
he died in the land of the Byzantines. The [important] people (al-nās) wanted to pledge allegiance to al-ʿAbbās but al-ʿAbbās rejected it and
ceded to Abū Isḥāq the command [rulership]
and then Abū Isḥāq turned his face towards
Baghdad quickly and he was fearful for himself
about a group of the commanders who were
disquieted by him. And thus he arrived at it at
the beginning of the month of Ramadan of the
year 218/833. He stayed in it two years, then he
moved to surra man raʾā in the year 220/835
. . . And then Byzantium attacked Zibaṭra. And
so Abū Isḥāq turned his face towards ghazw in
Jumāda I of the year 223/838 and he conquered
Amorion in the month of Ramadan of this year
then after that he made preparations to leave and
he fell upon al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn and ʿUjayf
on his way. He approached surra man raʾā in
Dhū al-Hijja of that year. And Ibrāhīm b. alMahdī died in surra man raʾā in the month of
Ramadan of the year 224/839 and he gibbeted
al-Afshīn in the year 226/840–41.36
Through context, Ibn Qutayba connected alMuʿtaṣim scurrying back to Baghdad in fear for his life
to the raid on Amorion. Given the distance, something
around forty days is hardly scurrying quickly. As well,
Ibn Qutayba made no mention of a coup attempt. He
merely stated that al-Muʿtaṣim assaulted al-ʿAbbās and
ʿUjayf b. ʿAnbasa without giving an explicit reason
why.37 However, his phrasing and connective clausing
draws a line between the succession, the assault and
the expiration of troublesome, yet powerful individuals. The reader is led to infer that al-Muʿtaṣim did
this because the officers wanted to swear loyalty to
Ibn Qutayba, al-Maʿārif, 392.
Of course, his purpose was not to be comprehensive, and leaving such details out could have been an editorial decision.
36
37
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al-ʿAbbās instead of him and they continued to do so
after his renouncing it. In the end, al-ʿAbbās, it seems,
in an effort to avoid another civil war, opted to bide
his time and take the oath of allegiance.38 He was also
faced with the problem that while he had arrived on
the scene in time for his father’s death, he had done so
largely unaccompanied by the bulk of his forces who
had remained in Ṭuwāna. This would have given alMuʿtaṣim significant leverage over him but would not
have extirpated residual support for al-ʿAbbās. This
also explains the next point in the will.
The second provision of the will was that, with
reference to the Byzantines, al-Muʿtaṣim should “be
mindful/wary of these people in whose front yard
you are and so do not ignore them at any time.”39 The
destruction of the fortifications under construction
at Ṭuwāna and the removal of its colonists was alMuʿtaṣim’s first act as Caliph.40 Al-Azdī and al-Ṭabarī
agree that he did this before heading for Baghdad.
This would make sense of the forty-day journey from
Tarsus to Baghdad. As noted above, al-ʿAbbās b. alMaʾmūn, under orders from his father, had been fortifying the town and settling new residents in it. It
served as a forward base of operations but was more
than a mere hilltop-outpost. Significant investment
had been made to insure that it was added permanently to the Caliphate. Al-Muʿtaṣim’s destruction of
it and the removal of all weaponry could be interpreted as an effort to pull back from an exposed position leaving nothing usable for the enemy. Or, equally
likely, it could be interpreted as the destruction of a
possible base of operations for a powerful ʿAbbāsid
rival to whom many in the military leadership wished
to swear allegiance.
Note that Ṭuwāna was not as exposed a forward
position as is often asserted. In 216/831 there were
a series of very successful raids originating from there
deep into Byzantine territory.41 Thus it was under
continuous occupation and had been for some time.
Al-Dhahabī said that ʿAbbās was the first to take the oath to
al-Muʿtaṣim. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh al-Islam,
ed. ʿU. Tadmurī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1990), volume for
the years 211–20, 27.
39
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii. 1138. However, as Amikam Elad
pointed out in his comments on a draft of this paper, al-Maʾmūn
could have been referring to the inhabitants of Baghdad.
40
Ibid., iii, 1164. Yazīd b. Muḥammad al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh alMawṣil, ed. A. Habibah (Cairo: al-Majlis al-Aʿlā liʾl-Shuʾūn, alIslāmiyya, 1967), 415; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, vol. for the years
211–20, 28. Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, v. 6, 439.
41
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1104.
38
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This supports the contention that al-Maʾmūn ordered
al-ʿAbbās to reinforce and strengthen an already existing emplacement. At the same time that he ordered
al-ʿAbbās to fortify and expand it, al-Maʾmūn levied
troops from Syria and Egypt. A large number of men
were placed under al-ʿAbbās’ command with him in
Ṭuwāna.42 Al-ʿAbbās was modifying the fortifications
to accommodate the addition of this new larger contingent on a permanent basis. Though forward and
more exposed than other areas, when al-ʿAbbās was
given this task, the fort had been operational for some
time. As such, it was unlikely to have been in any
greater danger from the Byzantines at the death of
al-Maʾmūn than before, particularly since a massive
force was already garrisoned there in preparation for
an intended assault towards Constantinople.43
Given the description of the number of troops, one
easily infers that this was to be an expedition of the
same size if not larger than the one that al-Muʿtaṣim
made against Amorion. Three months before he died,
al-Maʾmūn set his son up in a fortified position with
a large army. The army would gain experience, and
al-ʿAbbās would gain renown in what was going to be
a major expedition against the Byzantines. Al-ʿAbbās
would have strengthened his hand in establishing himself as a legitimate ruler and continuator of his father’s
policies (of course, not reckoning that his death was
imminent). His credentials as a military commander
and ghazi Caliph would be secured. Al-Muʿtaṣim
would need these credentials as well, and would pursue a similar course of action to attain them. Given
the circumstances of al-Muʿtaṣim’s ascension to the
throne, taking this opportunity away from al-ʿAbbās
was of paramount importance.44
While primogeniture was not the established mechanism for inheritance of leadership, almost every prior
Caliph, when able to express his wishes concerning
succession, indicated a preference for his own son.
Succession by a brother was not by any means anomalous but neither was it a foregone conclusion. Clearly
42
Ibid., iii, 1111–12. al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 412 indicated
that all of them were sent with al-ʿAbbās to Ṭuwāna.
43
Al-Yaʿqūbī also mentioned that Amorion, as it was on the way,
was also a target of this mission. al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 428–29.
Also see al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 414–15. Bonner and von Sivers
note the expedition. M. Bonner, Aristocratic Violence and Holy War
(New Haven, 1996), 148. Sivers, “Taxes and Trade,” 78.
44
That he took control of the frontier provinces away from alʿAbbās at the same time reinforces my point. al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh,
v. 2, 430.

al-Maʾmūn was establishing a rivalry between the two
main contenders for the throne.45 Given recent precedents, al-Muʿtaṣim must have discerned the prospects of being sidelined. As Nawas points out, both
al-ʿAbbās and al-Muʿtaṣim were equally qualified for
succession.46 That al-Muʿtaṣim was older does not
necessarily mean that he had an edge; consider alManṣūr’s succession struggle with his uncle ʿAbdallāh
and the sidelining of ʿĪsā b. Mūsā.47
Now we turn to the third and fourth provisions of
the will. Al-Muʿtaṣim was told to pursue Bābak and
the Khurramiyya, along with a description of the type
of commander for the task. Al-Afshīn is not named,
but the description given applies well to both him and
his behavior on that campaign. The will also specifies
the behavior of the Caliph. It is a suspiciously prescient account of how both al-Afshīn and al-Muʿtaṣim
would conduct themselves in the course of the campaign. This argues for a dating of the forgery of the
will to the period after al-Maʾmūn’s death and before
al-Afshīn’s disgrace in 225/839.
Fifth, the will warned that “exhortation” must be
backed up by action. Al-Muʿtaṣim would have to follow
the same path as his brother to prove his credentials,
but it was vital that he brought them to a successful
conclusion. As no specific target was mentioned, nor
was glorious victory predicted (as with the above concerning the Khurramiyya), this helps to confirm my
dating of the document and narrows it even further to
a point before the launch of the Amorion campaign.
At this point there is a break in the will, which notes
that al-Maʾmūn’s condition worsened and he summoned his brother to his bedside. This serves the purpose of signaling that the designation of his brother
as heir was in place and not the product of a deathbed
pronouncement. The narrative in al-Ṭabarī explicitly
places the first half of the will chronologically while alMaʾmūn was still alive and al-Muʿtaṣim was elsewhere.
The interjection seems to address the legal problem
that one could not issue or even make changes to a
will from the deathbed.48 If he issued the proclamation
and then promptly died, the missive would have been
For more, see Marsham, Rituals of Islamic Monarchy, 266.
Nawas, “All in the Family?,” 78, n. 3.
47
For more on that context, see H. Kennedy, The Prophet and
the Age of the Caliphates, 2nd ed. (London, 2004), 129–30, 136;
and Marsham, Rituals of Islamic Monarchy, 196–97, 205–207.
48
For more on inheritance rules, see J. Schacht, An Introduction
to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964), 169–74; and K. Vikor, Between God
and the Sultan: A History of Islamic Law (Oxford, 2005), 318–21.
45
46
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invalid. Summoning al-Muʿtaṣim underscores that alMaʾmūn had made his designation well in advance of
his death throes.49 Al-Ṭabarī explicitly says this before
recounting the text of the will.
Addressing the deathbed issue at this point introduces a problem for points six through thirteen, which
follow the interjection. These could be later interpolations that solved the deathbed issue, while also
accounting for al-Mutawakkil’s actions regarding Ibn
Abī Duʾād and a continuing concern over the independent position of the Ṭāhirids.50 But, given that it
was the will of a Caliph, a document publicly used to
validate the claim of the presiding Caliph, how likely
is it that such a visible emendation would have left no
other traces? It is more likely that it was a device to
attest to the authenticity of the will.
The sixth provision chided al-Muʿtaṣim to be just,
so that the change in succession was justified “as I have
transferred it from other than you to you.”51 Bosworth
in his translation glosses “it” as meaning “[the Messenger of God’s protection]” whereas I read this as an
acknowledgement that al-ʿAbbās had already been declared walī al-ʿahd as al-Dīnawarī asserted.52 To affirm
the orality and thus the authenticity of the document,
al-Muʿtaṣim interrupted the dying Caliph to say that
he would do as he had been told.
Continuing with the seventh point, al-Muʿtaṣim
was told to rely on ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir. My assessment is that this is merely what it purports to be, an
exhortation not to jumble the power structure of the
state. Of course, al-Muʿtaṣim would do just that on
the Amorion campaign; but the author of the will appeared not to know that. The eighth point seems to
confirm my reading of the previous, that al-Muʿtaṣim
should rely on the Ṭāhirid Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm as his
lieutenant, which he also would. Isḥāq was an ally of
Ibn Abī Duʾād and would maintain his position at the
center of power until his death in 235/850.53
For the ninth point, al-Muʿtaṣim was admonished
that the ʿAbbāsid family was not qualified for much
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1135–36.
El-Hibri briefly mentions the possibility of the will having
been altered later. El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography,
120–21.
51
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1138.
52
Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, The Reunification
of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, trans. C. E. Bosworth, vol. 32 (Albany,
NY, 1987), 229.
53
For more on this period, see J. P. Turner, “The End of the
Miḥna,” Oriens 38 (2010).
49
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and that he should avoid them. The will told him that
he could rely on only one somewhat obscure member
of the family and to appoint him (ʿAbd al-Wahhāb)
as its leader.54 This is what one would expect from alMaʾmūn but not from al-Muʿtaṣim’s coterie, as they
represented, in effect, a rapprochement within the
ʿAbbāsid family.55 Ironically, al-Muʿtaṣim did in the
end take this advice, as he became increasingly more
reliant on his personal force, the Turkish guard.
In the tenth provision, very famously he was told
to keep Ahmad b. Abī Duʾād close and to put his
trust in him. Many have mistaken this to be an explicit
admonishment to continue the Miḥna, which it was
not. Ibn Abī Duʾād was not yet identified as the leader
of the Miḥna. Tellingly, this is his first appearance in
al-Ṭabarī’s chronicle. Of the four named figures in the
will that al-Muʿtaṣim was told to rely upon, Ibn Abī
Duʾād was the only one in a position to author the
will. The following point helps to substantiate this.
The eleventh point of the will said to choose a good
Vizier. This is tantalizing, yet problematic, because it
was immediately followed by point twelve, in which
Yaḥyā b. Aktham, the rival, immediate predecessor,
and successor to Ibn Abī Duʾād as chief qāḍī was specifically singled out for opprobrium. This would have
been an odd commentary coming from al-Maʾmūn,
as he had two years before placed Yaḥyā b. Aktham in
charge of a very successful raid into Byzantine territory in the year 216/831.56 It would not have been
odd coming from al-Muʿtaṣim and Ibn Abī Duʾād,
however, with whom bad blood existed.57 As Yaḥyā’s
and al-ʿAbbās’ positions strengthened, those of Ibn
Abī Duʾād and al-Muʿtaṣim weakened. This could be
read as the motive for the timing of murdering alMaʾmūn. Point twelve serves as prime evidence that
Ibn Abī Duʾād was the author of the will. However,
it is important to underline that Yaḥyā b. Aktham
was not the vizier. He was the chief qāḍī. Of course
Ibn Abī Duʾād would have known this, as would any
Amikam Elad, in his comments on a draft of this paper, makes
a compelling argument that this was actually ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b.
ʿAlī b. Muḥammad (al-Mahdī) b. ʿAbdallāh (al-Manṣūr) who led
the family to Samarra and not the ʿAbd al-Wahhāb whom Bosworth
identified in his translation of al-Ṭabarī. See Abū Bakr Aḥmad b.
ʿAlī al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh madīnati as-salām, ed. B. A.
Maʿrouf (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 2001), v. 12, 282. I thank
Amikam for pointing this out to me.
55
Nawas, “All in the Family?”
56
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1104.
57
al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 423. Again, I thank Amikam Elad
for this reference.
54
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c ontemporaneous readers. Thus these must have been
two separate provisions, but one is left with the un
settling perception that perhaps they were not.
And finally point thirteen: be kind to the ʿAlids.
It was a general admonishment without any specific
recommendations and was to be expected from alMaʾmūn. The text of the will then moved to its conclusion with a quote from the Qurʾān (3:102). It is
odd that, for a man obsessed with the Qurʾān (compare to al-Maʾmūn’s Miḥna letters), this was the only
reference to scripture in the whole of the document.
Al-Muʿtaṣim was told to “fear God” and rule as a good
Muslim. The text ends with a plea for the forgiveness
of al-Maʾmūn’s sins. Next at the age of forty-eight or
forty-nine years old58 he died, and al-ʿAbbās and alMuʿtaṣim took the body to Tarsus for burial. Al-Ṭabarī
and al-Yaʿqūbī both reported that al-Muʿtaṣim and not
al-ʿAbbās prayed over him.59
The Background to the Will
To elucidate the implications of the will, let us turn
to the broader context for this succession. The war
between the brothers al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn (194–
198/809–813) had caused a severe breakdown in the
authority of the center. An important repercussion of
this war for the dynasty was the dramatic rift within
the ʿAbbāsid family itself that left al-Maʾmūn bereft
of meaningful familial support.60 After al-Maʾmūn had
won the war, but before he returned to the capital in
204/819, the elite of the capital, including his family
members, seriously misbehaved. Their behavior improved slightly in his presence, but al-Maʾmūn became increasingly reliant on those who had come from
Marw with him, most visibly Ṭāhir b. al-Husayn and
his kin. Of the ʿAbbāsids, the only one that he seems to
have relied on and to have received important support
and help from was his younger brother, Abū Isḥāq, the
future al-Muʿtaṣim. Ismāʿīl al-Bilī asserts that, as alMuʿtaṣim was not part of the factional politics of their
father’s court and not really of the faction of al-Amīn,
this must have made him an attractive supporter for al-

58
This, in an interesting parallel, was roughly the same age at
which his father, his brother al-Muʿtaṣim, and his nephew al-Mutawakkil would die. Al-Wāthiq would die before the age of forty,
confirming the trend of early death in the family.
59
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1140. al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 429.
60
For more see Nawas, “All in the Family?”

Maʾmūn.61 He goes on to argue that al-Muʿtaṣim was
al-Maʾmūn’s “right hand man,” and that this does not
seem to have provoked a rivalry between al-ʿAbbās and
his uncle. From this he extrapolates that the issue of
succession did not arise between the two, as everyone
was too busy. I find this hard to accept. Succession
struggles were the defining narrative for all of the Caliphs from the beginning. Al-Muʿtaṣim was essential to
al-Maʾmūn’s plans—but then again, so were al-ʿAbbās,
the Ṭāhirids, and al-Maʾmūn’s other generals.
Another important consequence of the fourth fitna
was the profoundly negative effect it had on the stability and discipline of the army. The imperial army
of the metropole had been defeated and al-Maʾmūn’s
new army (with elements of the old) had stepped into
its place but could not do so completely.62 He tried
his best to co-opt the abnāʾ al-dawla but was reluctant, with good reason, to rely on them. The years
204–218/819–833 were a period of reconstruction
and reconsolidation of the empire. Thus, the bulk
of al-Maʾmūn’s reign was engaged in restoring control.63 It was mostly successful except in regards to
the ʿAbbāsid family and with a few trouble spots like
Bābak’s Khurramiyya.
Thus 218/833 would have been a propitious time
for al-Muʿtaṣim to remove al-Maʾmūn. The disruptions had abated enough so that al-Muʿtaṣim could
stage a coup without worrying about destroying the
whole empire. Upon winning the war against al-Amīn,
one of the first things that al-Maʾmūn had to do was
to make his army into an imperial army.64 Al-Maʾmūn’s
army under Ṭāhir was strong enough to set about restoring order and reintegrating the Caliphate, but he
needed others to avoid becoming too dependent on
any one general. One need only recall the position of
Abū Muslim to recognize the predicament. For this,
he turned to his brother who had been actively creating a private guard of servile origins. Given the chaos
of Baghdad from the siege until al-Maʾmūn’s arrival
61
O. S. Ismāʿīl al-Bīlī, Prelude to the Generals (Reading, UK,
2001), 33.
62
For further details on this army, see A. Elad, “Mawālī in
the Composition of al-Maʾmūn’s Army: a Non-Arab Takeover?,”
in Patronate and Patronage in Early and Classical Islam, ed. M.
Bernards and J. A. Nawas (Leiden, 2005); A. Elad, “The Armies
of al-Maʾmūn in Khurāsān (193–202/809—817–18),” Oriens 38
(2010). Also see H. Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs (New York,
2001), 118.
63
H. Kennedy, “The Decline and Fall of the First Muslim Empire,” Der Islam 81 (2004): 4.
64
See Gordon, Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 30.
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seven years later in 204/819, this was likely initially a
private bodyguard prudently hired for protection during an almost total breakdown of law and order. This
force would, in time, grow, but would never be very
large. Ītākh, Waṣīf and Ashinās, the top rank of the
first generation of the Samarran elite, were purchased
at this time. It is important to note that this was not
a proper army of the imperium, nor was it intended
to be. Al-Yaʿqūbī tells us that al-Muʿtaṣim had 3,000
slave soldiers (ghilman) by the end of al-Maʾmūn’s
reign.65 While large, this was his personal guard and
not a field army. Ultimately, it reinforced his power
over a ruling elite who would never organize effectively enough to defeat or eliminate them.
Gordon has argued that at first these soldiers were
somewhat ceremonial.66 For example, upon entering
Baghdad for the first time as Caliph, al-Yaʿqūbī tells
us that al-Muʿtaṣim equipped his guard with “gilded
silk brocade,”67 thus marking them off as special.
While their “ceremonial” purpose can be debated, alMuʿtaṣim had had some success against the kharijites
as Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī’s agent during the chaos of
Baghdad at the beginning of al-Maʾmūn’s reign, but
his troops had not really been tested. Being chosen
by Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī for that task indicates nothing
more than that he had a moderately organized force in
a time when there were few of those at hand.
In 214/829–830, al-Muʿtaṣim was sent to Egypt
to put down a rebellion for al-Maʾmūn.68 He did so,
but the province erupted in revolt once again in the
next year and al-Maʾmūn had to go personally; with
the aid of al-Afshīn, he restored order.69 This, in itself,
was hardly an unusual occurrence; however, one could
draw the inference that al-Muʿtaṣim’s troops were neither dominant nor numerous enough to operate in
two theaters simultaneously. This is the reason why:
at the beginning of his own reign, these troops were
Aḥmad b. Abī Yaʿqūb b. Jaʿfar al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān,
ed. A. W. T. Juynboll (Leiden, 1861), 255–56.
66
Gordon, Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 24.
67
al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 430. See Gordon, Breaking of a
Thousand Swords, 24, in which he cites al-Masʿūdī as relating the
same information. Northedge notes that there is statuary and
painting evidence that dressing troops in this way was not unusual.
A. Northedge, The Historical Topography of Samarra (London,
2005), 168.
68
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1101.
69
Ibid., iii, 1105. al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 423. Ibn Abī
Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr indicated that the rebels were getting the best of alMuʿtaṣim, who needed reinforcements. Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitâb
Bagdâd, 265.
65
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not deployed against the Zuṭṭ (219/834) and only in
a logistical capacity against Bābak.70 ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir
subdued the ʿAlid rebel Muḥammad b. Qāsim. At
the same time, ʿUjayf b. ʿAnbasa was sent successfully
against the Zuṭṭ. Next, al-Afshīn’s campaign against
Bābak (219/834–222/837) emphatically established
his credibility as a very good general, and Ītākh and
Bughā suffered by comparison.71 In that campaign,
they were deployed in a position clearly subordinate
to al-Afshīn. They also come across as roundly and
dangerously incompetent. Al-Muʿtaṣim’s army did
not appear to be that formidable in contrast to that
of ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir, ʿUjayf, and al-Afshīn.72 If one
considers this description, then why al-Muʿtaṣim did
not move against al-ʿAbbās b. al-Maʾmūn, his supporters, and al-Maʾmūn’s men immediately upon his rise
to the throne is quite obvious. His guard did not have
the prestige to be the dominant elite of the army of
the Caliph. In addition, al-Muʿtaṣim was dependent
on his brother’s former generals to preserve the stability of the Empire. His Turkish guard was faced with
competitors, such as al-Afshīn, who were effective and
competent, yet politically suspect. Both ʿUjayf and
al-Afshīn would be disgraced, humiliated and then
executed shortly after their triumph and glory. The
Ṭāhirids would prove to be too useful and entrenched
for this treatment.73
The Amorion Campaign and the Purge
Ironically, coming roughly halfway through his reign,
the Amorion campaign established al-Muʿtaṣim as a
ghazi caliph. The campaign and the subsequent purge
more firmly brought the Caliphate under his control.
We know more about the campaign against Amorion
than practically any other.74 We also find it glorified
70
Gordon speculates that Bughā’s abysmal performance could
explain “why the Turkish guard was kept in Iraq. . .” Gordon,
Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 76.
71
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1171–82, 1187–1234.
72
Ayalon notes that in spite of generally unimpressive results,
the mamlūk troops were preferred for their “military superiority;”
he is certainly correct, and the position of Ītākh and Bughā highlight this; Ayalon, “Military Reforms,” 25.
73
Given the hints and allegations surrounding al-Afshīn that he
was after the Ṭāhirid domains, perhaps with some encouragement
from the court, it is not a far reach to suspect that such a gambit
was in the offing but proved unsuccessful with al-Afshīn bearing the
full brunt of retribution for the failure.
74
It is interesting that al-Afshīn’s campaign against Bābak is the
other campaign that we know the most about. In fact, al-Ṭabarī
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in Abū Tammām’s famous Qaṣīda.75 One problem
with all of that is that the campaign really was not
worthy of the accolades. It was a relatively minor and
fleeting victory. It received such notice because of the
internal propaganda value it yielded for the Caliph.
It provided “proof ” that the Caliph was a legitimate
ghazi, or at the very least as legitimate as his brother
and more so than his nephew. It also proved that his
Turks were a capable and competent field army and
not just a personal guard. Al-Afshīn, in spite of having
met, fought and defeated the Byzantine Emperor on
his way to Ankara, was virtually ignored in the account
as a battlefield commander.76 The campaign on Amorion, despite its minimal impact, was a major logistical
operation. It began in 223/838 with a great deal of
preparation. Al-Afshīn was in charge of the northern
prong of a prolonged pincers movement converging
first on Ankara and then Amorion. Al-Muʿtaṣim with
Ītākh and Ashinās commanded the southern prong.
The attack did not necessarily go as planned, but in the
end Amorion was taken after a relatively short siege.
The turn of events after this point, as related by
al-Ṭabarī, is confused. It is a strange and sordid tale
indeed and one that stretches credulity. The narrative
comes to a head with al-ʿAbbās getting drunk with the
Caliph and naming names of his supporters who had
planned to kill al-Muʿtaṣim and his Turkish generals,
so that they then could be arrested and executed.77
Those who had been fingered, along with al-ʿAbbās
himself, were shackled and each was killed in a creative manner. Among these, ʿUjayf and al-ʿAbbās were
given very salty food while water was withheld. They
subsequently died of dehydration, which in al-ʿAbbās’s
case was hurried along by being wrapped in a felt

devoted many more pages to it than to the Amorion campaign, yet
it receives less attention.
75
J. Bray, “Al-Muʿtaṣim’s ‘Bridge of Toil’ and Abū Tammām’s
Amorium Qaṣīda,” in Studies in Islamic and Middle Eastern Texts
and Traditions in Memory of Norman Calder, ed. A. Samely, G. R.
Hawting, and J. A. Mojaddedi (Oxford, 2000). S. P. Stetkevych,
Abū Tammām and the Poetics of the ʿAbbāsid Age (Leiden, 1991).
76
Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāṭ al-ʿUsfurī, Taʾrīkh Khalīfa Ibn Khayyāṭ,
ed. M. N. Fawwaz and H. K. Fawwaz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub alʿIlmīya, 1995), 316–17. al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1242–44. The Byzantine sources do not neglect this defeat: see W. T. Treadgold, “The
Chronological Accuracy of the ‘Chronicle’ of Symeon the Logothete for the Years 813–845,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 33 (1979):
184. I owe this reference to Etienne de la Vaissiere.
77
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1263–64.

blanket in the heat of the day.78 ʿUjayf was executed
by the Ṭāhirid Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, while al-Afshīn
personally dispatched al-ʿAbbās. Having them die of
thirst instead of by other means left no visible marks
of abuse. This choice was not an indicator of status but
of an interest in covering the tracks of the executioners. This provided them with plausible deniability, but
more importantly protected those who carried out the
orders from prosecution for that killing: they might
be held responsible for neglect but not for murder.79
Al-Muʿtaṣim went so far as to have al-ʿAbbās’s four
brothers by his mother Sundus imprisoned by Ītākh.80
They died of unspecified causes in his basement. As
for the others, ʿAmr al-Farghānī was beaten severely
and then buried alive;81 Al-Shāh b. Sahl was decapitated; and Ahmad b. al-Khalīl was thrown into a pit
in Samarra as a prison that, after some time, his jailors
(under orders) tried to fill with water.82 It did not work
because the ground absorbed all of the water, so they
had to take him out. The manner of his death is not
recorded, but as it took a number of days, one is safe
in assuming that it probably took the same form as
the murders of ʿUjayf and al-ʿAbbās.
In addition, an unnamed Turk killed himself with
a knife smuggled into his prison.83 This, along with
the note that Turks were among the unnamed officers purged, raises an important point that the limiting factor was not ethnicity.84 This was a purge of
al-Maʾmūn’s supporters, neither only al-ʿAbbās’s nor
only the non-Turkish elements.85 According to al78
However, al-Dhahabī in his brief note for al-ʿAbbās stated that
he died in the year 224 after having gone into rebellion in 223. alDhahabī, Taʾrīkh, volume for the years 221–30, 217. He repeated
al-Ṭabarī’s version with the information about the coup. Interestingly he did not include it in the Siyar. Al-Azdī says that al-ʿAbbās
was killed at Manbij and then ʿUjayf after him. al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh
al-Mawṣil, 427. They were killed at the same time when safely away
from the frontier. Al-Masʿūdī barely mentioned that al-Muʿtaṣim
imprisoned him. His death was recorded without mention of cause.
al-Masʿūdī, Murūj al-dhahab, v. 4, 55.
79
J. Lassner, The Middle East Remembered (Ann Arbor, MI,
2000), 241. Kennedy argues that non-marking executions will become the norm for high status victims. Kennedy, When Baghdad
Ruled, 238–39.
80
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1267. The names of the four brothers
are given in al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 428.
81
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1265.
82
Ibid., iii, 1266–67.
83
Ibid., iii, 1266.
84
Ibid., iii, 1267.
85
Ismāʿīl said “Yaʿqūbī reports that he kept al-Maʾmūn’s men
in the administration for only three months and then dismissed
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Ṭabarī, there were two cases of clemency and one case
of state’s evidence. Al-Hārith al-Samarqandī was one
of the original plotters, but was spared because he
bore witness against al-ʿAbbās.86 Harthama b. Naḍr alKhuttalī lived through the intercession of al-Afshīn.87
We see nothing more of him in this source. The other,
al-Sindī b. Bukhtāsha, had his name cleared after his
arrest.88 This is last we hear of him, as well. The Fragmenta tells us that seventy were killed in all.89
By any calculus, the purge was massive. In spite of
its size, we should note that even when al-Muʿtaṣim
did make his move in initiating it, he only pursued
some of the high-ranking officers and not their subordinates.90 The rank-and-file stood by and let it happen because they were paid generously and were flush
with the booty of Amorion. Al-Yaʿqūbī tells us that
al-ʿAbbās had 116,000 dinars with him when he was
arrested.91 Presumably this was to pay for the plot.
Al-Muʿtaṣim confiscated the money and then distributed it among the troops. Each soldier received two
dinars with the Caliph resolving a shortfall out of his
own pocket. One can never really know for sure, but
as al-Ṭabarī tells it, the narrative was very convenient
for al-Muʿtaṣim’s purposes.
It also makes sense. As these events took place on
the frontier, no one in the capital was in a position to
gainsay it and those who survived the purge had little
incentive to. In addition, eliminating officers after
the troops had been well-paid and were on their way
home was less likely to have sparked a revolt than at
some other point. Gordon interprets the purge of the
coup plotters and the removal of al-Afshīn as leaving a
vacuum that the Turkish guards were left to fill. This
it did. However, given the events of the succession
and the contrivances in the narrative of the purge,
it is not a stretch to say that al-Muʿtaṣim created the
vacuum on purpose and that its focus was not merely
to promote the Turkish guard but also to break the
them all.” Ismāʿīl al-Bīlī, Prelude to the Generals, 84–85. I have been
unable to track his reference down in the editions of al-Yaʿqūbī’s
Taʾrīkh that I have. If this is true, then this is a startling bolster to
my theory.
86
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1264.
87
Ibid., iii, 1267.
88
Tentative reading of the name following Bosworth. Abū Jaʿfar
Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Storm and Stress along the Northern
Frontiers of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, trans. C. E. Bosworth, vol. 33
(Albany, NY, 1991), 132.
89
De Goeje, Fragmenta, v. 1, 398.
90
Ibid. The source reads “al-quwwād wa-l-ʾumarāʾ.”
91
al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 437.
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back of residual loyalty to al-Maʾmūn and al-ʿAbbās.
Whatever the instigation, he benefitted immensely
from it. Khalifa b. Khayyat’s account is informative
in this regard:
And in the year 223/838 the Commander of the
Faithful Abū Isḥāq al-Muʿtaṣim bi-llah set off at
the head of a great multitude. And so he penetrated deeply into the land of the Byzantines and
al-Afshīn Khaydhar b. Kāwus approached and
encountered the Tyrant (Byzantine Emperor)
. . . And so he (al-Afshīn) defeated him and he
killed 4000 of his companions [i.e., soldiers].
The Commander of the Faithful set off (again)
and alighted near ʿAmūriyya [Amorion] and
al-Afshīn came to him. Thus the Commander
of the Faithful captured it forcibly on Tuesday
with thirteen days remaining in the month of
Ramadan (August 9, 838). And so a great many
were killed and a great many were taken prisoner
and he destroyed the city and he razed it. And
before the Commander of the Faithful arrived
at ʿAmūriyya he destroyed what he passed by of
their villages and the Byzantines fled in all directions. And in it (223) he destroyed Ankara then
the Commander of the Faithful turned his face
homewards on Saturday with nine days remaining in the month of Ramadan. And then he cut
off the heads of 4000 of the prisoners and he still
continued to kill the prisoners on his journey
and to burn until he entered the lands of Islam.
And in it (223) the Commander of the Faithful
brought forth the unbeliever Bābak. And so he
commanded that his hands and feet be cut off.
Then he cut his head off and gibbeted him and
this was in Ṣafar of the year 223.92
The first thing one notes about Ibn Khayyat’s
a ccount is the jumbling of events, that Ankara was captured after Amorion. The details but not this order are
well-attested elsewhere. However, there is something
more important missing. He mentions neither a coup
attempt nor succession troubles of any sort.93 Granted,
his account is generally sparse, but one would expect
such a major occurrence to make an appearance. Remember also that Ibn Qutayba’s account mentioned
al-ʿUsfurī, Taʾrīkh, 316–17.
Ibid., 315. In his note for the end of al-Maʾmūn’s reign, he
merely mentioned the date of al-Maʾmūn’s death without any reference to al-ʿAbbās at all. Also al-ʿUsfurī, Taʾrīkh, 317.
92

93
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a purge of ʿUjayf and al-ʿAbbās but no plot.94 As well,
al-Dīnawarī mentioned neither plot nor purge nor raid
on Amorion. While this evidence is not ironclad proof,
it does raise significant doubts as to whether al-ʿAbbās
had really been plotting. Kennedy has noted that the
narrator al-Ṭabarī used for the Amorion campaign
intently wanted to “justify” the purge of al-ʿAbbās
and his supporters.95 Elsewhere, he had written that
the narrative sought to bolster al-Muʿtaṣim’s army, to
“stress their competence and loyalty, in contrast to the
followers of al-ʿAbbās who are shown as undermining
the military effort.”96 Perhaps al-ʿAbbās was plotting—
and there is significant evidence for this—but whether
he was or not, this served as a convenient pretext for
clearing the decks of the “old guard,” those who had
supported al-Maʾmūn. By killing al-ʿAbbās and his
brothers, he eliminated the potential for a Maʾmūnid
restoration.97 This in turn argues that whether or not
there was a real plot is almost irrelevant to the fact
that a purge was inevitable. Al-Muʿtaṣim did not want
to upset the recentralization that had been achieved
by al-Maʾmūn after the fourth fitna and thus did not
remove al-ʿAbbās immediately upon his succession to
the throne; another open civil war, and the situation
would have been irretrievable; the entire edifice of the
Caliphate would have been rent asunder.
Conclusions and Tying Up Loose Ends
The Amorion campaign and the subsequent purge
resolved two lingering issues left over from the death
of al-Maʾmūn. First was the problem of al-ʿAbbās
and those inclined to support him; and second, alMuʿtaṣim’s legitimacy as holder of the office of the
Caliph. The purge, whether al-ʿAbbās was plotting or
not, solved one issue, but it could not be dealt with
until the second issue had been resolved; a great and
highly publicized victory would do quite nicely. Even
if it was not a terribly consequential one, leaving few
residual effects in terms of the war with the Byzantines, it was enough to have Abū Tammām’s poem
ring loudly. The effect of the purge and subsequent
removal of al-Afshīn, which assuredly was part of this
Ibn Qutayba, al-Maʿārif, 392.
Kennedy, Armies of the Caliphs, 133.
96
H. Kennedy, “Caliphs and Their Chroniclers in the Middle
Abbasid Period (Third/Ninth Century),” in Texts, Documents and
Artefacts, ed. C. F. Robinson (Leiden, 2003), 25–26.
97
For a different take on the possibilities of a Maʾmūnid restoration, see Nawas, “All in the Family?”
94
95

process, was to force al-Muʿtaṣim into ever-greater
reliance on his Turkish forces.98 As such, the overreliance on the Turkish forces came as a result of the
purge and not vice-versa. It was not a purge in favor
of elevating the Turks, but one intended to eliminate
opposition to al-Muʿtaṣim. The side effect was that
Ibn Abī Duʾād and the Turkish officers became kingmakers long before the elevation of al-Mutawakkil to
the throne.
According to al-Ṭabarī, al-Muʿtaṣim died as the
result of a cupping gone wrong.99 Interestingly, Ibn
Māsawayh, the doctor whom al-Ṣulī accused of malfeasance in the death of al-Maʾmūn, is said to have also
committed gross malpractice resulting in the death
of al-Muʿtaṣim.100 Further, al-Wāthiq suffered from
edema, which was relieved through the application
of heat, and thus he died as a result of being left in an
oven (tannūr) too long, while Ahmad b. Abī Duʾād,
Ibn al-Zayyāt, Umar b. Faraj and al-Faḍl b. Isḥāq
al-Hāshimī stood by—three of whom would be part
of the cabal that selected al-Mutawakkil.101 Al-Ṭabarī
furthered the suspiciousness of that episode by including a brief alternate version, which had Ibn Abī Duʾād
alone with him when he was overcome by the heat.
One does not have to stretch far to see this as a murder.102 The circumstances surrounding al-Maʾmūn’s
98
For more, see Gordon, Breaking of a Thousand Swords,
chapters 2 and 3. Al-Afshīn appeared in the purge narrative rather
prominently as a defender of al-Muʿtaṣim. He was one of the few
of al-Maʾmūn’s generals to do so, and thus had to be dealt with in
another way at another time; hence his trial in 225/840. For his
trial, see J. P. Turner, “Al-Afshīn, Heretic, Rebel or Rival?” in Abbasid Studies II, ed. Nawas.
99
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1323.
100
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ, 211. Also noted by alṬabarī, Storm and Stress, 207, n. 609.
101
al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1363. Al-Yaʿqūbī described it as a pit in
the ground “like an oven (tannūr) then heated by tamarisk wood.”
al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, v. 2, 446. al-Yaʿqūbī also stated that the oath
of allegiance was taken for his son while he was still alive. El-Hibri
briefly discusses al-Wāthiq but does not dwell on the manner of his
death. T. El-Hibri, “The Image of the Caliph al-Wāthiq: a Riddle
of Religious and Historical Significance,” Quaderni di Studi Arabi
19 (2001). For more discussion of his reign, see J. P. Turner, “The
Enigmatic Reign of al-Wāthiq (r. 227/842–232/847),” in Abbasid
Studies IV: Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies, ed.
M. Bernards (forthcoming).
102
Going further afield, one might note that Ibn al-Zayyāt was
given credit for creating the tannūr, a torture device similar to an
iron maiden. Could this be a subtle way of saying that al-Wāthiq was
tortured to death? There is no way to know, but the possibility does
raise questions. I thank James Montgomery for helping me to see
this possibility. For more, see Turner, “The End of the Miḥna,” 93.
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death as noted at the beginning were equally suspicious. Importantly, Ibn Abī Duʾād was present for all
three deaths. According to al-Dīnawarī, he led the
prayers over al-Muʿtaṣim.103 It is odd that the son, heir,
and new Caliph, al-Wāthiq, did not do that. Ibn Abī
Duʾād led the prayers over al-Wāthiq as well.
The purge was a successful consolidation of power,
but it left al-Muʿtaṣim in a vulnerable position. He was
able, due to the personal loyalty of the first generation of Turkish commanders, to maintain control in
Samarra. When he died, Ibn Abī Duʾād in conjunction
with that first generation was left in charge of the state
and its new, young ruler. Ashinās, Ītākh, Waṣīf, Ibn
al-Zayyāt and Ibn Abī Duʾād were the power behind
al-Wāthiq, and it was they who chose al-Mutawakkil.
They “managed the succession” and they took care of
the business of ruling.104 However, they were unable
to completely control al-Wāthiq, who, in engaging in a
building program in Samarra, converting it from camp
into a city,105 was probably trying to curry favor with
103
al-Dīnawarī, al-akhbār, 401.13. al-ʿUsfurī, Taʾrīkh, 317, confirms some of the details given by al-Dīnawarī. Al-Ṭabarī gave no
indication of anyone praying over al-Muʿtaṣim.
104
Kennedy, When Baghdad Ruled, 231.
105
Gordon, Breaking of a Thousand Swords, 78–79. For more on
the specifics of his building, see Northedge, The Historical Topography of Samarra, 99–100.
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the Turkish elite and thereby gain more independence
of action.
I posit that it was for this that Ibn Abī Duʾād murdered him. He was unable to control the succession
and had to acknowledge Waṣīf ’s objection that alWāthiq’s minor son was too obviously a puppet.106 He
hit upon the idea of placing the young al-Mutawakkil
on the throne but did not count on his canny will for
independence. Al-Mutawakkil was able to break free
from him and the clique that had installed him, but in
doing so exacerbated his condition of dependence in
Samarra. In the end, this consumed him, and the fence
holding the Turkish forces at bay and under control
was smashed. In the end, internal dynastic concerns
were what thrust the Turkish guard to the front and
center as the power base for the Caliphs. Meanwhile,
the internal wrangling over control of al-Wāthiq and
al-Mutawakkil by Ahmad b. Abī Duʾād, Ibn al-Zayyāt
and the Turkish commanders left no one solidly in
charge.

106

al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, iii, 1368.
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